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Abstract 
This study reviews the existing literature on the U.S. peer review system and the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection system to assess our knowledge 
of audit regulation. The traditional self-regulatory system of the accounting profession came 
to an end, in 2002, when the PCAOB was established to oversee the audit firms of publicly 
traded companies. This paper contributes to the controversial debate about self-regulation 
versus independent regulation by analyzing, categorizing, and comparing the research 
findings on the peer review system and the PCAOB system along three dimensions: the 
validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections, the recognition of reviews and inspections 
by decision-makers (e.g. investors, bankers, committees), and the effect of reviews and 
inspections on audit quality. Synthesizing the research on the regulatory regimes suggests 
that the notion of external quality control, both through peer reviews and government 
inspections, is positively linked with an improvement of audit quality. At the same time, the 
analysis indicates that external users do not seem to recognise peer review and PCAOB 
reports as very useful instruments for decision-making, which is in line with an identified 
rather skeptical perception of the audit profession on reviews and inspections. Overall, this 
study reveals that although the academic literature on peer review and PCAOB inspection is 
extensive it has not produced definitive conclusions concerning various aspects of audit 
regulation. This paper shows how this blurred picture is due to conflicting research findings, 
the dominance of the quantitative research paradigm, and unchallenged assumptions within 
the literature, and concludes by proposing research opportunities for the future. 
 
Keywords: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), Inspection, Peer review, 
Quality assurance, Self-regulation, Accounting history, American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Peer reviews and government inspections are basic instruments for restoring trust in 
auditing by securing audit quality through tackling perennial problems in corporate financial 
reporting. The two modes of external audit quality control aim at assessing whether audit 
firms have developed appropriate quality control policies and procedures, and whether these 
are implemented in compliance with professional accounting and auditing standards. They 
consist of an assessment of selected audit engagements and an evaluation of a firm’s internal 
quality control system. Although external quality assurance is only one element of the 
broader notion of audit regulation it is, in particular, the way in which a system of external 
quality control is organized, implemented, and overseen that determines whether the 
regulatory system achieves its goal of protecting the interests of investors and the public 
(Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Mastrolia, 2011; Francis, Andrews, & Simon, 1990; Palmrose, 
2013).  
Controlling audit quality through external assessments became a decisive topic in audit 
regulation when the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) initiated an 
intra-professional peer review programme for its member firms, first voluntarily, later 
mandatorily in the 1980s. However, when, in a series of corporate frauds, the accounting 
profession failed to meet the social expectations of ensuring the faithful representation of the 
state of companies such as WorldCom and Enron, trust in professional-self regulation broke. 
To restore the belief in financial reporting, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
in 2002, which replaced the traditional self-regulatory system with a system of public 
oversight, making SOX the most important corporate-governance legislation since the 
Securities Acts in the 1930s (Boster, 2007; Church & Shefchik, 2012). Although the Act led 
to a variety of fundamental changes in financial reporting, the introduction of mandatory 
governmental inspections was the most significant one; it was the “the fundamental tool 
Congress gave to the Board to restore public confidence in audited financial reporting” 
(PCAOB chairman Goelzer, 2005, p. 1).1 Given the U.S. transition’s significant influence on 
audit regulation on the global regulatory landscape, it is important to review the effects of the 
PCAOB and to assess whether the transition was successful, and, if so, in which aspects.2  
A substantial number of papers have been published over the last quarter of a century on 
the subject of audit regulation. This paper contributes to the controversial debate about public 
oversight versus self-regulation by reviewing and synthesizing the academic literature about 
the profession’s peer review system and the current PCAOB system. The study incorporates 
the findings on the former AICPA peer review system and contrasts them with research 
results on the current PCAOB system, as only the direct evaluation and comparison of self-
regulation and profession independent regulation allows the drawing of conclusions about the 
legitimacy of one regulatory regime over another. A better and holistic understanding of the 
different systems seems to be necessary for future reforms and to decrease the risk of 
                                                 
1
 To release the PCAOB from the administrative burdens of a federal agency (Coates IV, 2007; Gradison & 
Boster, 2010), it was formally established as a private entity. Nevertheless, the PCAOB is perceived as a “quasi-
public” entity (Boster, 2007, p. 135) as the fact that the PCAOB is “anything other than governmental has never 
even been contested” (Gradison & Boster, 2010, p. 10).  
2
 As a direct response to the establishment of the PCAOB, other countries reformed their legal system by 
introducing public oversight systems (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015; 
Löhlein, 2016; Malsch & Gendron, 2011).  
producing politically unintended and potentially dysfunctional consequences. As such, this 
study extends prior assessments of the regulation of public company auditing in the U.S. 
(Abernathy, Barnes, & Stefaniak, 2013; Glover, Prawitt, & Taylor, 2009; Kinney, 2005; 
Palmrose, 2013).  
The categorizing of the literature is based on a framework that assess the legitimacy of 
each of the two regulatory regimes in three ways: firstly, it analyses whether peer reviews and 
PCAOB inspections yield valid results; secondly, it considers whether peer reviews and 
inspection results were used in financial decision-making; thirdly, it assesses the effect of 
peer reviews and PCAOB inspections on the level of audit quality. The multiple findings of 
each particular research study were unbundled and arranged according to the three aspects of 
the developed framework. The sources of this study were articles in accredited journals and 
working papers. Relevant papers were identified by searching the databases (e.g. Business 
Source Premier, EBSCOhosts, Emerald Management eJournals, and Jstor databases) with the 
following keywords: peer review, PCAOB inspection, self-regulation, AICPA, Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, regulation, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enforcement, audit 
quality. In addition, the reference section of each study was reviewed to detect papers not 
identified during the initial database search, leading to an overall total of 47 studies that form 
the basis for this analysis.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the 
framework for categorizing the research findings and describes the historical development 
from a professional peer review system to the current PCAOB inspections. In the next two 
sections the research findings on peer review and on PCAOB inspections are separately 
analyzed, followed by a comparison in the subsequent section. This is followed by an outline 
of identified research gaps and concluding remarks.  
 
2. Organizing framework 
 
To compare the peer review with PCAOB inspections, it is necessary to be clear about 
the relevant benchmark. In audit regulation there has never been much agreement concerning 
the assessment of mechanisms regulating the audit profession (Mautz, 1984). The 
consequence is disunity, due to methodological and conceptual problems of identifying 
assessment measures as well as disputes on who should determine and define them (Arens, 
Elder, & Beasley, 2011; Sutton & Lampe, 1991). The organizing framework for this paper 
emerged inductively as a result of the analysis of the scientific research on the peer review 
system and the PCAOB inspections. It is based on three aspects that dominate the scientific 
debate on audit regulation: the validity of peer reviews and inspections, the recognition of 
peer reviews and PCAOB inspections, and their effect on audit quality.  
 
2.1. Validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections  
 
Peer reviews and inspections are perceived as pivotal mechanisms to improve and 
maintain a high level of audit quality. To this end, reviews and inspections must be objective 
and based on reliable information, evaluation, and justification. Paraphrasing DeAngelo 
(1981), reviewers and inspectors have to be able and willing to discover a deficiency in an 
audit engagement or a breach in the quality control system of an audit firm. The relationship 
between expertise and independence has always played a particular role in the debate on audit 
regulation: prior literature has argued that the shift from peer reviews to PCAOB inspection 
represents a trade-off of expertise for independence (e.g. Carcello et al., 2011; DeFond, 2010; 
Palmrose, 2006). This interpretation results from the perception of inspectors as being more 
independent than reviewers, whereas a higher level of technical knowledge and experience is 
generally attributed to the latter (Bellovary & Mayhew, 2009; DeFond, 2010; Grumet, 2005). 
Hence, the technical knowledge and the degree of independence of a reviewer and inspector 
determine what is defined in this framework as validity of external quality control. The first 
component along which the research studies are categorized is therefore stated in the 
following research question: 
 
RQ1: Do peer reviews and inspections lead to valid results? 
 
Insights about the validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections were found in a 
variety of research approaches. Some studies have examined whether there is evidence for a 
relationship between reviewer characteristics and review findings (Colbert & Murray, 1998; 
Wallace, 1991), or whether review and inspection results are biased by the information 
advantage of reviewers and inspectors (Emby, Gelardi, & Lowe, 2002; O’Keefe, King, & 
Gaver, 1994). Other studies have drawn conclusions on the validity of the results from a 
comparison of peer review and PCAOB reports about the same firm (Anantharaman, 2012; 
Ragothaman, 2012). Moreover, the analysis of the responses of audit firms to review and 
inspection outcomes (Bishop, Hermanson, & Houston, 2013; Blankley, Kerr, & Wiggins, 
2012; Church & Shefchik, 2012; Wallace & Cravens, 1994), and surveys gauging opinions 
on peer reviews and inspections (Daugherty & Tervo, 2010; Ehlen & Welker, 1996; Newman 
& Oliverio, 2010), allowed further conclusions about the validity of the systems. 
 
2.2. Recognition of peer reviews and inspections in decision-making 
 
Research has shown that financial market participants reward companies that employ 
high-quality auditors (Barton, 2005; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, & Stefchik, 2013). A 
necessary condition, however, is that the audit quality among audit firms can be 
differentiated. Therefore, the second component of the framework addresses whether market 
participants use the results of peer reviews and inspections as surrogates for audit quality. 
The second component along which the research studies are categorized is therefore stated in 
the following research question: 
 
RQ2: Do financial markets recognise peer reviews and PCAOB reports as useful instruments 
for decision-making? 
 
Empirical studies have shed light on this question by analyzing the variability in audit 
fees (Francis et al., 1990; Giroux, Deis, & Bryan, 1995) and by examining the number of 
clients that the audit firm gained or lost (Daugherty, Dickins, & Tervo, 2011; Hilary & 
Lennox, 2005; Lennox & Pittman, 2010). In other studies, questionnaires and surveys (Alam, 
Hoffman, & Meier, 2000; File, Ward, & Gray, 1992; Schneider & Ramsay, 2000; Woodlock 
& Claypool, 2001), and experimental designs (Payne, 2003; Robertson & Houston, 2010; 
Robertson, Stefaniak, & Houston, 2014; Wainberg, Kida, Piercey, & Smith, 2013) have been 
used to reveal whether financial experts recognise peer review and PCAOB results as being 
useful for decision-making. Common to these studies is that the analysis of the informative 
value of peer review and inspection results allows conclusions to be drawn on the perceived 
level of audit quality. The effect of peer reviews and inspections on actual audit quality is the 
focus of the third component of the framework.  
 
2.3. Effect of peer reviews and inspections on audit quality 
 
Any legitimate regulatory system must be able to meet the goals of regulation. Although 
the SOX introduced multiple regulatory changes, it is in particular the PCAOB inspection 
programme which is seen as the primary vehicle for improving overall auditing quality 
(Boster, 2007; Carcello et al., 2011; Church & Shefchik, 2012). Thus, the third component 
along which the research studies are categorized is therefore stated in the following research 
question: 
RQ3: Do peer reviews and inspections improve audit quality? 
 
Empirical work on the association between external quality assurance and audit quality is 
hampered by the lack of observable measures of audit quality. In other words, much of the 
difficulty in assessing the external quality control instruments for improving audit quality is 
related to the “elusiveness of the concept itself” (Alam et al., 2000, p. 410). Nevertheless, 
conclusions about the effect of external quality controls on audit quality were identified in 
various research studies. Empirical work on the former peer review system has applied 
alternative evaluation methods to assess whether reviewed firms provide higher audit quality 
than non-reviewed firms (Deis & Giroux, 1992; Krishnan & Schauer, 2000; O’Keefe et al., 
1994; Rollins & Bremser, 1997). In contrast, research on the PCAOB inspections has used 
audit client-specific measures to evaluate the extent to which inspection contributes to audit 
quality (Abbott, Gunny, & Zhang, 2013; Carcello et al., 2011; Gramling, Krishnan, & Zhang, 
2011; Gunny & Zhang, 2013; Offermanns & Peek, 2011). Other studies have researched the 
effect of inspections on the composition of the audit market (DeFond & Lennox, 2011), or 
have directly asked financial experts about the effect of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections 
on audit quality (Blankley et al., 2012; Daugherty & Tervo, 2010; Felix & Prawitt, 1993; 
McCabe, Luzi, & Brennan, 1993; Newman & Oliverio, 2010).  
The next section describes how, in four major steps, the notion of external quality 
assurance has been transformed from a core feature of the professional self-regulatory 
understanding into a highly regulated and (quasi-)governmental affair.  
 
3. Regulatory Background: from AICPA peer reviews to PCAOB inspections 
 
3.1. The emergence of peer reviews 
 
Since the mid-1960s external audit quality control has been a central element in the 
debate on maintaining and enhancing audit quality, as questions about the performance, the 
credibility, and the role of audit firms began to rise when the collapse of large national 
companies caused huge losses to investors and heightened congressional concern for the 
safety of customer funds (Federal Committee, 1976a). As a result of several disciplinary 
actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), large accounting firms organized 
sporadic firm-on-firm reviews (Fogarty, 1996; Sperry, Spede, & Hicks, 1987). The debate 
about audit quality came back in 1973 when detection of massive accounting frauds at Equity 
Funding and Penn Central came under serious attack in Congress. The Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigation (Federal Committee, 1976a) criticized the self-regulatory 
framework of the AICPA for insufficiently serving the public interest, and regarded the 
SEC’s “hands-off approach” concerning the organization and supervision of the accounting 
profession as insufficient to protect public investors (Federal Committee, 1976a, pp. 31, 83). 
Another investigation, the Subcommittee on the Accounting Establishment (Federal 
Committee, 1976b) went as far as to demand the introduction of an inspection programme 
under “the General Accounting Office, the SEC, or a special audit inspection agency,” 
(Federal Committee, 1976b, p. 22) because the regulatory setting was perceived as 
inadequately designed. Although the proposal did not find a political majority, it was obvious 
that the AICPA had to respond to these controversies to secure opinion leadership on external 
quality assurance and to restore public trust in professional self-regulation. To this end, the 
AICPA created the AICPA Division for CPA Firms in 1977, to implement and to organize a 
voluntary peer review programme (Giroux et al., 1995). 
3.2. The voluntary peer review system from 1977 to 1988 
 
The AICPA Division consisted of two sections that administered the peer review 
programme: the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) for all firms that audited at least one SEC 
client, and the Private Companies Practice Section (PCPS) for all the other firms.3 
Membership in the Division was voluntary, but participating firms had to undergo a peer 
review at least every three years and were required to adhere to the AICPA’s quality control 
standards (Loscalzo, 1979; Sperry et al., 1987). However, due to the voluntary nature the 
review programme never attracted a critical mass of practice units. The profession’s 
rejectionist stance on the system became an issue when several cases of fraudulent financial 
reporting and corporate failures (e.g. Drysdale Securities, Washington Public Power Supply 
System, Baldwin-United) put the profession (once again) under defence, yielding severe 
intra-professional debates on whether the participation in peer review should become 
mandatory for AICPA member firms.4 Peer review became a divisive topic for the auditing 
community, pitting small audit firms that opposed it against larger firms that supported it 
(Berton, 1986). The latter became indirectly supported by SEC, which threatened the 
profession with the launch of a government inspection programme if the profession continued 
to reject obligatory peer reviews. This caused the AICPA to start broad-based lobbying 
actions among the profession. After the first vote, the profession rejected the introduction of a 
mandatory peer review system; in the second vote in January 1988, AICPA members 
eventually adopted changes to close the gap between those firms that had voluntarily 
participated in a peer review and those which had not (Russell & Armitage, 2006, p. 47) .  
 
3.3. The mandatory peer review system from 1988 to 2002  
 
As a condition of a firm’s membership in the AICPA, the reform required firms to enroll 
either in the AICPA Division of CPA Firms (and then to become subject to a peer review 
either in the SECPS or in the PCPS) or to enroll in the newly created AICPA Quality Review 
Program (QRP) that operated under the direction of a senior AICPA committee (Ehlen & 
Welker, 1996).5 The procedures of the QRP and the SECPS were similar and were designed 
as a compliance test to ensure the appropriateness of an audit firm’s quality systems. Audit 
firms could choose to be reviewed by a team which was assembled by the AICPA, or private 
CPA association, or a review team where all members belonged to another audit firm, the 
latter being chosen in more than 90 percent of the cases (Gunny & Zhang, 2006). The only 
major difference was that the results in the SECPS were available for the public, whereas the 
contents of the QRP’s reviews were kept confidential. The fact that for non-SEC accounting 
firms two similar but separate peer review programs were in operation, and overall three 
programs existed, caused confusion both among AICPA members and the public (AICPA 
                                                 
3
 To oversee the SEC Practice Section, the AICPA also established a Public Oversight Board (POB), composed 
of profession-independent public servants (Zeff, 2003, p. 201).  
4 Already the Subcommittee on the Accounting Establishment had criticised that a voluntary peer review system 
would contain deficiencies that would undermine the objective of improving the performance and credibility of 
the accounting profession (Federal Committee, 1976b, p. 114). 
5
 From 1989, audit firms with public company clients were required to join the SECPS (Russell & Armitage, 
2006, p. 47).  
1995; Elsea & Stewart, 1995). Thus, in 1995, the QRP and the PCPS were merged into the 
AICPA Peer Review Program.  
Although peer review became mandatory for AICPA member firms in 1988, quality 
assurance still remained a core feature of professional self-regulation. The fundamental 
transition from self-regulation to public oversight was then executed within just a couple of 
months when, between autumn 2001 and spring 2002, a wave of revelations of accounting 
fraud at Enron, WorldCom, and other large U.S. companies eroded the trust in the 
functioning of self-regulation. Both Enron and WorldCom were audited by Arthur Andersen, 
which received an unmodified peer review conducted by Deloitte & Touche in the same year 
(Mason, 2005, p. 6). This pulled the rug out from under the credibility of the peer review 
system, resulting in an outcry from the public for the political actors to “do something” 
(Mulford & Comiskey, 2011, p. 423). Within that political tsunami, Congress passed SOX in 
2002, which replaced self-regulation by one statutory regulation, overseen by PCAOB “to 
protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of 
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports” (SOX Sec. 101 (a)).6 
 
3.4. PCAOB inspections from 2002  
 
All auditing companies with publicly traded securities in the U.S. must be registered with 
the PCAOB. They are thereby subject to the PCAOB’s oversight system (SOX Sec. 102 (a)), 
which performs its work through the development of audit standards, the registration and 
inspection of public accounting firms, and the enforcement and investigation process in cases 
of violations of laws and the PCAOB’s rules. The PCAOB distinguishes between annual and 
triennial inspections: audit firms with more than 100 clients are inspected every year, firms 
with 100 or fewer clients are inspected every three years (SOX Sec. 104 (b)). PCAOB 
inspections examine a firm’s work on the selected audit engagement and the firm’s quality 
control system (SOX 104 Sec. 104 (d)). Broadly, the inspection process covers a wide 
spectrum of activities, from the evaluation of an audit firm’s tone-at-the-top, partner 
compensations, and compliance with professional codes of conduct for the proper application 
of audit procedures and documentation, to assessing the appropriateness of the audit evidence 
collected (Glover et al., 2009). For every inspection, the PCAOB prepares an inspection 
report (SOX Sec. 104 (g)), however, weaknesses in an audit firm’s quality control system are 
only published if the firm fails to address these deficiencies within one year. If no violations 
of the PCAOB’s rules or standards are identified, the inspection process ends with the 
disclosure of the report.  
 In the next sections, the research findings on the former self-regulatory peer review 
system and the current PCAOB system are categorized and analyzed along the framework, 
and finally compared.  
 
4. Analysis of the AICPA Peer Review System 
 
4.1. Validity of AICPA peer reviews  
 
As outlined, the degree of independence and expertise of a review and inspection team 
determine the validity of the external quality control. Wallace (1991) was the first to research 
whether the results of peer reviews were affected by the reviewer’s degree of independence 
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 As a result of SOX, the AICPA restructured its peer review system into the AICPA Peer Review Program 
(PRP), which focuses on the auditing practices of audit firms for non-public clients (Gramling & Watson, 2009). 
Many audit firms are therefore today subject to PCAOB inspections as well as AICPA’s peer reviews 
(Bellovary & Mayhew, 2009). 
from the reviewed audit firm. Independence was operationalised, classifying the reviewer 
into three main categories: an AICPA-appointed review team, firm-on-firm arrangement, or 
an association-sponsored review team. Because no significant relationship was found 
between the type of reviewer and peer review outcomes, the study concluded that peer 
reviews provided valid and reasonable results. More recent studies, however, have conflicted 
with the results of Wallace. 
Hilary and Lennox (2005) and Anantharaman (2012) provided evidence that reviewing 
firms were more likely to issue unfavorable opinions if they were a direct competitor of the 
reviewed firm, whereby the local distance between the two firms served as proxy for 
competition. Anantharaman showed that firms that chose their reviewers were more likely to 
obtain more favorable peer reviews compared to firms which were reviewed by a review 
team composed by the AICPA. In addition, the study demonstrated that experienced 
reviewers were more likely to issue unfavorable review reports than less experienced 
reviewers. Lennox and Pittman (2010) examined whether an audit firm was more likely to 
switch to another reviewer if its previous peer review outcome was cautious or adverse. This 
strategic reviewer change by audit firms would be consequential to the revealed relationship 
between a specific reviewer and review outcome (Wallace, 1991). Indeed, the findings 
indicate that audit firms were more likely to switch to another reviewer if their previous peer 
review opinions were modified or adverse. In this sense, the peer review programme caused 
audit firms to strategically select their reviewers as the type of reviewer had a considerable 
effect on the outcome of the review. 
The information advantage of a reviewer over an audit firm was identified by King, 
Welker, and Keller (1994) and Emby et al. (2002) as another factor affecting the validity of a 
peer review. They found that reviewers were unable to disregard outcome knowledge in the 
peer review process, which led to biased peer review results. King et al. (1994) showed that 
the allegation of lack of independence of the audit firm negatively affected the reviewer’s 
assessment of the audit quality of the firm under review. This ultimately resulted in less 
favorable review results. Emby et al. demonstrated that auditors who knew about a specific 
negative outcome rated outcome-consistent evidence items as more important while positive 
outcome information did not appear to affect the evidence evaluation of the reviewers.  
Although the majority of research findings provide evidence that the validity of peer 
reviews was impaired for several reasons, the accounting profession had an opposing view. 
Ehlen and Welker (1996) documented that audit firms had a positive perception of their 
reviewers. The profession’s satisfaction with peer reviewers can also be seen in the study of 
Wallace and Cravens (1994) and their analysis of statements by reviewed firms. Based on a 
descriptive analysis of response letters to the AICPA, the study concluded that the majority of 
the reviewed firms accepted the proposed suggestions from the reviewers. Taking the 
different studies together, an interesting picture emerges: while the accounting profession 
publicly emphasized that the peer review system worked effectively in terms of improving 
audit quality (Ehlen & Welker, 1996; Wallace & Cravens, 1994), it seems that accounting 
firms actively took advantage of the existing loopholes in the system (Hilary & Lennox, 
2005; Lennox & Pittman, 2010).  
Table 1 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings concerning the validity 
of the peer review system.  
 
4.2. Recognition of peer reviews for decision-making 
 
The literature on the recognition of peer review results can broadly be divided into two 
strands: quantitative archival research and research designs with a focus on individual 
participants. Archival research used different indicators for the reaction of the financial 
market to analyze whether peer review outcomes were used and perceived as a quality-
differentiating factor (Francis et al., 1990; Giroux et al., 1995; Hilary & Lennox, 2005). The 
first insights about the market’s reaction to review results was provided by Francis et al. 
(1990). They hypothesized that in the case of perceived quality differentiation among audit 
firms, peer reviewed firms would charge higher audit fees. However, they did not identify 
audit fees as being associated with participation in the (at that time) voluntary peer review 
system. Giroux et al. (1995) extended the study to the public sector audit market. In contrast 
to Francis et al. (1990), they found that firms that had been reviewed positively were able to 
charge significantly higher audit fees. This was explained by the specific characteristics of 
the public sector audit market, which was characterized as having a high level of competition 
and a broad range of low-quality audit suppliers. Hilary and Lennox (2005) used the changes 
in the number of clients as being indicative of the audit market’s awareness of peer reviews, 
as, in their sample, reviewed firms that achieved clean opinions gained clients whereas firms 
given modified opinions lost clients. The authors concluded that peer reviews were able to 
provide credible information to audit clients and that the audit market reacted to the 
information provided by peer review reports.  
The second broad research strand examined the perceptions and attitudes of individual 
actors (e.g. individual investors, clients of audit companies) towards peer review (Bellovary 
& Mayhew, 2009; Deis & Giroux, 1992; File et al., 1992; Schneider & Ramsay, 2000; 
Woodlock & Claypool, 2001).  
File et al. (1992) asked bankers and auditors for their opinion on the influence of several 
factors on their judgment of an auditor’s credibility. The findings support Francis et al. 
(1990) because the study identified peer review reports as having the least influence on 
financial judgments, compared to firm size and industry expertise. Similar results were found 
in the study by Schneider and Ramsay (2000), in which bank lending-officers executed an ex-
post evaluation of audit quality. The authors found that peer reviews did not directly affect 
the willingness of the bank lending-officers to approve lines of credit. This is consistent with 
Woodlock and Claypool (2001), who revealed that almost two thirds of the audit committees 
of public companies did not consider peer review reports when recommending an audit firm 
to the management of a company. In line with these results, Bellovary and Mayhew (2009) 
used an experimental research design to show that peer review reports did little to enhance 
the quality of investment choices. 
Surveys among audit firms about the perception of their stakeholders towards review 
reports revealed a similar and critical attitude from audit firms. In the survey of Elsea and 
Stewart (1995), over 90 percent of CPA firms doubted that their clients were interested in 
their review results and only 20 percent believed that companies referred to review results 
when selecting a CPA firm for auditing services. Consequently, not even half of the firms 
used their reviews as promotional or marketing instruments. Similar results were revealed in 
a survey study by Ehlen and Welker (1996), in which a large majority shared the opinion that 
their client firms did not seem to care about the reviews. Interestingly, in both surveys, 
accounting firms that had been conducting reviews for a longer period of time were less 
critical than auditors who had just begun to work as peer reviewers, which might suggest that 
experiencing a review reduced the initial negative attitude towards it.  
Payne (2003) identified the timeliness of a report’s issuance as a factor which could 
explain the financial market’s disinterest for review results, as found by the majority of 
studies (Alam et al., 2000; Ehlen & Welker, 1996; Elsea & Stewart, 1995; File et al., 1992; 
Francis et al., 1990; Schneider & Ramsay, 2000; Woodlock & Claypool, 2001). He assumed 
that the ability of an audit firm’s client to deduce audit quality from the peer review findings 
decreased as the time between peer reviews increased. In fact, the results of his experiment 
indicate that a one-year review period, in contrast to the three-year review period at that time, 
would have allowed clients to identify high-quality auditors. This is consistent with a survey 
by Russell and Armitage (2006), in which audit firms stated that a three-year cycle provided a 
two-year window for performing substandard work. The peer review’s complexity was 
identified as an alternative and/or additional explanation by Alam et al. (2000), who showed 
that review experts questioned the investment community’s ability to understand the 
underlying procedures and mechanisms of a peer review process, and suggested this could 
lead the investors to disregard review results in decision-making processes.  
Table 2 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings concerning the 
perception and recognition of peer reviews in financial decision-making.  
 
 
4.3. Effect of peer reviews on audit quality  
 
As outlined in the framework, the third aspect of categorizing the research focuses on the 
link of peer review and audit quality. To draw conclusions about the peer review system’s 
effect on audit quality, various studies have used alternative audit quality measures, and 
analyzed reviewed audit firms in comparison with non-reviewed firms (Casterella, Jensen, & 
Knechel, 2009; Deis & Giroux, 1992; Krishnan & Schauer, 2000; Rollins & Bremser, 1997). 
Deis and Giroux (1992) compared the peer review findings for small CPA firms, which were 
auditing school districts, with the findings of external quality controls conducted by the Audit 
Division of the Texas Education Agency, and concluded that peer reviewed audit firms 
performed higher-quality audits. Rollins and Bremser (1997) analyzed whether certain audit 
firm characteristics were related to enforcement actions against the auditor. In fact, the 
logistic regression model showed that peer reviewed firms were less likely to receive SEC 
sanctions than non-reviewed audit firms. Krishnan and Schauer (2000) used the level of 
compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as being indicative of 
audit quality. They examined the financial statements of various companies to evaluate 
whether the required accounting disclosures had been made in different areas. They found 
that the statements of peer reviewed firms complied more with GAAP than those of non-
reviewed audit firms. Casterella et al. (2009) associated audit quality with the occurrence of 
litigation or claims of malpractice against an audit firm, and revealed that the number of 
weaknesses identified in peer review reports was associated with audit failure.  
Instead of an alternative audit-quality measurement, Giroux et al. (1995) used audit fees 
as proxy for audit quality. The study showed that peer reviewed audit firms charged 
significantly higher audit fees. As no fee differences were identified on a per-hour basis, the 
authors concluded that higher fees correlate with more extensive audit procedures, which in 
turn indicate a higher level of quality audits.  
The empirical findings which demonstrated the peer review’s positive effect on audit 
quality were supported by Grant, Bricker, and Shiptsova (1996), who modeled auditing as a 
multi-person social dilemma. In a series of laboratory experiments, they showed the difficulty 
of obtaining a high level of average audit quality in a setting with no external quality 
controls, whereas audit quality increased in a peer review system.  
In contrast, Alam et al. (2000), O’Keefe et al. (1994), and Shafer, Morris, and Ketchand 
(1999) neglected the positive link between peer reviews and audit quality. Similarly to 
Krishnan and Schauer (2000), O’Keefe et al. analyzed the compliance with GAAP. They 
found that the participation in peer reviews was not significantly related to violations. Shafer 
et al. (1999) questioned whether adverse peer review opinions were viewed as deterrents to 
aggressive reporting decisions. In an experiment, professional auditors were asked to estimate 
the likelihood of a material misstatement being detected as a result of a peer review. Most of 
the participants stated that the effect of peer reviews was marginal, leading the authors to 
conclude that peer reviews did not provide adequate incentives for firms to reduce the 
incidence of financial statement misstatements. Alam et al. asked audit firms, audit clients, 
financial analysts, and bankers to rank the importance, and evaluate the effectiveness, of 
different aims of the peer review programme. The results show that the peer review 
instrument was not perceived as an adequate instrument for reducing audit failures and 
detecting audit fraud in financial statements; additionally, however, the peer review 
programme was identified as an important means to maintain professional self-regulation.  
Surveys among audit firms that participated in peer reviews provided similar results. 
Although there was a generally positive orientation towards peer reviews, audit firms 
questioned the program’s contribution to audit quality (Ehlen & Welker, 1996; Felix & 
Prawitt, 1993; McCabe et al., 1993). In the survey of McCabe et al. (1993), almost all 
respondents reported that peer reviews increased a firm’s ability to comply with professional 
standards. At the same time, almost half of the respondents doubted that peer review 
improved the likelihood of detecting material misrepresentation. The negative view 
concerning the association between peer review and delivered audit quality is consistent with 
the findings of Felix and Prawitt (1993). In their study, only one third of respondents reported 
positive changes in their audit practices as a result of peer review. This revelation is also 
supported by the study of Ehlen and Welker (1996), in which more than one third of 
reviewed firms in the Division for CPA Firms and almost two thirds of firms reviewed in the 
QRP described the review process as more “cosmetic” than “substantial”. 
Russell and Armitage (2006) identified several loopholes within the peer review system 
which might explain the profession’s skeptical view of the system’s effect on audit quality. 
The authors showed how particular aspects of the systems allowed audit firms with defective 
quality control systems to successfully pass a review process. Through a questionnaire, 
reviewed firms were asked whether they used actions that were defined as potential 
loopholes. Almost half of the audit firms responded that they worked on selected engagement 
documents before these were submitted to the reviewer. One fifth of the firms were 
furthermore able to self-select the engagement subject for review and the majority selected 
cases with a low risk of receiving negative peer review comments.  
Table 3 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings on the effect of peer 
reviews on audit quality.  
 
5. Analysis of the PCAOB Inspection system 
 
5.1. Validity of PCAOB inspections 
 
Research that was concerned with the validity of PCAOB inspections focused almost 
exclusively on questions concerning the technical skills and knowledge of PCAOB inspectors 
(Blankley et al., 2012; Glover et al., 2009; Houston & Stefaniak, 2013; Newman & Oliverio, 
2010). Glover et al. (2009) found individual cases in which inspectors failed to look at the 
riskiest areas of an audit, or drew incorrect conclusions, due to the technical complexity or 
their lack of prior experience in the specific field of engagement. Blankley et al. (2012) were 
then the first who analyzed the comments of the audit firms on the inspection reports. The 
inspection results were classified as “deficient”, “severely deficient”, and “pervasive failure” 
reports. Most firms with engagement deficiencies disagreed with the inspections and stated 
that the critical findings were the result of inadequate documentation and/or the incorrect 
application of accounting principles by the inspectors, and that they did not indicate genuine 
audit deficiencies. Studies highlight that in particular the audit firms with detected 
deficiencies showed high levels of disagreement with the competencies and technical 
knowledge of the inspectors (Blankley et al., 2012; Newman & Oliverio, 2010), whereas 
generally PCAOB inspectors were perceived as knowledgeable, competent, fair (Newman & 
Oliverio, 2010), and appropriately prepared (Daugherty & Tervo, 2010). Compared to peer 
reviewers, Ragothaman (2012) demonstrated PCAOB inspectors to be “tougher”. She 
compared the non-remediated weaknesses in the quality control system of triennially 
inspected audit firms with quality control weaknesses identified in peer review reports. The 
comparison revealed that PCAOB quality reports disclosed a higher number of weaknesses 
regarding engagement performance and independence than were detected by modified and 
adverse peer review reports. However, it has to be noted that the absence of an overall 
grading of the PCAOB reports creates serious methodological problems: depending on 
whether the study used modified or unmodified AICPA peer reviews as the unit of 
comparison, entirely different results occurred. 
While these studies analyzed triennially inspected audit firms, Church and Shefchik 
(2012) also included data from the Big Four firms in their analysis. They found that the Big 
Four disagreed more frequently with PCAOB findings than second-tier firms. Houston and 
Stefaniak (2013) then extended prior research by focusing on experienced partners from large 
and annually inspected audit firms, and by then reporting the perceptions of the partners 
about PCAOB inspectors and Internal Quality Reviews (IQRs). In the study, a majority of 
partners believed that, relative to IQR, PCAOB inspectors had an inferior understanding of 
the audit methodologies of the firms and that the feedback from PCAOB inspectors was less 
helpful for improving audit quality than IQR feedback.  
Table 4 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings concerning the validity 
of the PCAOB inspection system.  
 
5.2. Recognition of PCAOB inspections for decision-making 
 
Research has revealed the reaction of financial markets to PCAOB reports, in particular, 
in two ways: firstly, empirical studies have tested whether PCAOB reports are associated 
with client changes (Abbott et al., 2013; Daugherty et al., 2011; Lennox & Pittman, 2010) or 
with a movement in the stock price of the clients (Offermanns & Peek, 2011); secondly, 
experimental studies have focused on the evaluations and interpretation of PCAOB by 
financial experts (Robertson & Houston, 2010; Robertson et al., 2014).  
Lennox and Pittman (2010) analyzed the association between the number of weaknesses 
(none, one, or many) in PCAOB reports and the changes in the number of clients. Studies on 
the association between PCAOB reports and client changes (Abbott et al., 2013; Daugherty et 
al., 2011; Lennox & Pittman, 2010) are based on the assumption that, to evade market-
imposed penalties (e.g., higher costs of capital), public companies dismiss audit firms with 
deficiencies. They therefore expected a relevant increase, or decrease, in market share in 
terms of clients for firms receiving favorable, or unfavorable, reports. However, as no 
significant relationship was found, the study concluded that an audit firm’s market share is 
insensitive to PCAOB inspection reports. As their data consisted of triennially inspected 
firms, the three-year inspection cycle could be the reason because it creates a barrier that 
isolates high-quality auditors from low-quality providers, as revealed by Payne (2003) and 
Russell and Armitage (2006) in their studies on the peer review system. Another explanation 
could be seen in the way the template of the PCAOB reports is composed. In contrast to the 
former review system, which used predefined result categories (unmodified, modified, and 
adverse opinion), PCAOB reports do not provide users with a concluding and overall 
grading. Hence, it is not surprising that 76 percent of audit firms with no-deficiency reports 
would prefer the PCAOB to introduce an overall measure of audit quality (Newman & 
Oliverio, 2010).  
However, the findings of several other studies show that PCAOB outcomes are 
recognized for financial decision-making by the financial markets (Abbott et al., 2013; 
Daugherty et al., 2011; Offermanns & Peek, 2011; Robertson & Houston, 2010, p. 20). 
Daugherty et al. (2011) pointed out that deficiency reports were positively associated with 
dismissal of audit firms by their clients. In addition, the analysis shows that companies that 
dismissed audit firms with deficiencies were more likely to hire an audit firm with clean 
reports.7 Abbott et al. (2013) came to the same result. They examined the association between 
GAAP-deficient reports and changes in the number of clients. The authors found that 
triennially inspected audit firms were more likely to be dismissed by their clients compared to 
audit firms without identified GAAP deficiencies. 
Robertson and Houston (2010) and Offermanns and Peek (2011) also found evidence for 
the financial market’s perception of PCAOB reports. Robertson and Houston demonstrated 
that, under certain conditions, PCAOB reports can serve as a tool for signaling the credibility 
of audit opinions. They categorized deficiencies into “low-severity” deficiencies (failures that 
do not materially affect the financial statements) and “high-severity” deficiencies (failures 
that increase the probability that an audit will fail to detect a material misstatement). Then, 
financial experts were asked on a nine-point Likert-type scale to state their opinions about the 
ability of the inspection reports to positively affect the credibility of a firm’s future opinions. 
Overall, participants believed that PCAOB inspections improve the credibility of future 
audits. Offermanns and Peek found that shareholders are sensitive to the information 
contained in PCAOB inspection reports and that they view the reports as a meaningful signal 
of audit quality to investors. The researchers analyzed the reaction of stock price movements 
of the clients of the audit firms to 224 first-round and 134 second-round PCAOB inspection 
reports issued between 2005 and 2010. They demonstrated that the magnitude of market 
response to issuance of inspection reports corresponded to about 29 percent of market 
response to earnings announcements.  
With the exception of the findings of Lennox and Pittman (2010), the majority of 
empirical research indicates that financial markets are sensitive to PCAOB inspections. 
However, from a methodological point of view, the absence of an overall assessment 
hampers the cross-study comparison. Studies on the PCAOB regime use different approaches 
to categorize PCAOB reports into “good” and “bad”. While several studies consider all 
identified deficiencies to be of economically equivalent importance and classify the reports 
according to the number of deficiencies (Hermanson, Houston, & Rice, 2007; Lennox & 
Pittman, 2010; Offermanns & Peek, 2011) or the rate of deficiencies (Daugherty et al., 2011), 
other studies distinguish between the kind of deficiency (Abbott et al., 2013) or between the 
degree of severity of the inspected deficiencies (Blankley et al., 2012; Robertson & Houston, 
2010).  
Another critical aspect is highlighted by Wainberg et al. (2013) and Robertson et al. 
(2014), who point out the risk of misreading the PCAOB reports. Wainberg et al. asked 
experienced managers to make an auditor engagement decision on the basis of the PCAOB 
inspection reports for the audit firms. It appears that auditors continued to focus on anecdotal 
deficiencies and failed to consider the implications of the statistical data provided in the 
reports. The importance of embedding findings into a statistical context was also recognized 
by the PCAOB. In the PCAOB’s first years, PCAOB reports into large accounting firms did 
not provide users with statistical information that would allow them to assess the relative 
frequency of the detected deficiencies, which made the assessment of the quality of the 
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 However, the study did not find evidence that non-remediated quality control deficiencies (made public if they 
have not been solved within a period of 12 months) lead to a loss of audit clients, which conflicts with multiple 
studies (Hodowanitz & Solieri, 2005; Lennox & Pittman, 2010; Newman & Oliverio, 2010) that have criticised 
the PCAOB’s policy of keeping findings of the quality control system under lock. 
reports hardly possible. Following criticism concerning the informative value of the PCAOB 
reports, the PCAOB has added statistical information to all of its reports since 2010. While 
Wainberg et al. offered insights into how the way in which the inspection results are 
presented (statistical vs. anecdotal) can shape the perception of users, Robertson et al. 
demonstrate how the content can influence decision makers. In an experiment with corporate 
executives, they showed how negative information in the reports had a stronger effect on the 
judgment of the financial experts concerning the credibility of the audit firm than did the 
positive information, indicating that PCAOB reports gave rise to a perception that was 
actually worse than reality.  
Table 5 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings concerning the 
perception and recognition of PCAOB inspections in financial decision-making.  
 
 
5.3. Effect of PCAOB inspections on audit quality 
 
The first insights about the effect of PCAOB inspections on audit quality were delivered 
by studies which focused on audit market composition. They showed how PCAOB 
inspections pushed “low-quality” auditors out of the market, which was interpreted as an 
increase of overall audit quality (Daugherty et al., 2011; DeFond & Lennox, 2011; 
Hermanson & Houston, 2008; Read, Rama, & Raghunandan, 2004). Read et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that small audit firms were much more likely to cease performing SEC audits in 
the post-SOX period than in previous periods due to the perception of a more stringent 
oversight by PCAOB. According to Hermanson and Houston (2008) this was particularly the 
case for small audit firms, as the research data shows that firms that inadequately addressed 
their quality control defects were among the smallest firms in terms of partners and 
employees per client. The vast majority of quality control defects were thereby related to 
audit performance issues, followed by independence, monitoring and addressing identified 
weaknesses, partner workload, and review of interim financial statements.  
The effect of PCAOB inspections on small auditors was also revealed by DeFond and 
Lennox (2011). The study indicates that from 2002 to 2004 almost half the small audit firms 
left the audit market. The exiting firms were of relatively low quality in terms of the total 
number and severity of weaknesses detected in inspections. The study used the likelihood of 
firms being issued with going-concern opinions as being indicative of audit quality, thereby 
determining that exiting firms did in fact belong to the group of low-quality audit firms. The 
underlying assumption of studies using the frequency of going-concern opinions being 
indicative of audit quality (Gramling et al., 2011; DeFond & Lennox, 2011; Gunny & Zhang, 
2013) is that that low-quality audit firms are more likely to yield to the pressure of their 
client, and therefore issue fewer going-concern opinions.8 The result was supported by 
Daugherty et al. (2011), who found that deficiency reports caused involuntary and voluntary 
client losses. The figures show that low-quality audit firms voluntarily resigned from their 
clients because the costs associated with regulatory compliance outweighed the benefits of 
auditing publicly traded companies. Several other studies have later followed the approach of 
DeFond and Lennox and have utilized client-specific measures of audit quality, such as the 
frequency of going-concern opinions (Gramling et al., 2011; Gunny & Zhang, 2013) or the 
quality of earnings management (Carcello et al., 2011), to determine whether PCAOB 
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 An alternative explanation is that the change in going-concern reporting decisions indicates an increased level 
of competence brought to the reporting decision.  
 
inspections affect the quality provided by audit firms. The results point out the positive effect 
of PCAOB inspections on audit quality.  
Gramling et al. (2011) based their analysis on inspection reports of triennially inspected 
audit firms from 2004 to 2006. They showed that audit firms with deficiency reports were 
more likely to issue going-concern opinions for financially distressed clients after their 
inspection than prior to their inspection, providing evidence of the PCAOB inspection 
positively changing audit firm behavior. In contrast, Gunny and Zhang (2013) did not find a 
correlation between inspection outcome and the propensity to issue going-concern opinions. 
However, Gunny and Zhang also used abnormal accruals and restatements as an indication of 
audit quality. This is based on the idea that higher-quality audit firms are more likely to limit 
management’s accounting policy choices, thereby reducing earnings management, than are 
low-quality audit firms. The authors grouped the PCAOB reports into three categories and 
matched the clients to each triennially inspected auditor. The figures showed that low-audit-
quality audit firms were positively associated with firms receiving a seriously deficient 
inspection report.  
In contrast to going-concern opinions, Carcello et al. (2011) used earnings management 
as a proxy for audit quality. A company’s financial statements are seen as a joint product of 
the company’s management and the audit firm, therefore the use of earnings management as 
a proxy for audit quality is based on the assumption that the reduction of earnings 
management is an (indirect) outcome of an improvement of an accounting firm’s audit 
quality. They compared the financial statements of Big Four’s clients over the 12-month 
period before the issuance of the inspection report and the 24-month period subsequent to the 
issuance of the inspection report. A significant decline was found in accruals following each 
of the first and the second PCAOB inspections. Thus, the study showed that PCAOB is an 
effective instrument for reducing earnings management.  
Studies that have surveyed audit firms have revealed the positive attitude of the 
profession concerning the system’s effect on audit quality (Daugherty & Tervo, 2010; 
Newman & Oliverio, 2010). The findings suggest that small and large accounting firms 
evaluate the inspections differently. Whereas smaller firms do not agree with the statement 
that the inspection process has affected their audit services, large firms feel inspections have 
positively affected their audit business. Congruently, smaller firms do not agree that PCAOB 
inspections have improved overall audit quality, whereas larger firms view inspections as a 
positive contributor to audit quality (Daugherty & Tervo, 2010). Not surprisingly, the 
majority of firms with no reported deficiencies believe that the system contributes positively 
to the actual quality. Interestingly, although firms responded that, after having implemented 
reforms following their first inspection round, they received a no-deficiency report in their 
second inspection, still more than two thirds would prefer a five-year inspection cycle to a 
three-year one (Newman & Oliverio, 2010).  
Table 6 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings on the effect of PCAOB 
reports on audit quality.  
 
6. Results  
 
The first question for which the literature was analyzed was whether reviews and 
inspections lead to valid results. The analysis indicates that the former peer review system 
was mostly criticized for its perceived lack of objectivity—only one study did not make this 
observation. In contrast, multiple studies revealed that the outcome results were significantly 
affected by the characteristics of the reviewing firm, representing a loophole that audit firms 
used to strategically change their reviewer after unfavorable review outcomes. Research 
studies that analyzed the effect of PCAOB inspection team characteristics on inspection 
results could not be identified (see also Section 7). With respect to the question whether the 
review’s and inspection’s validity was hampered by a lack of expertise and technical 
knowledge, it can be concluded that the review system was highly accepted and reviewers 
were seen as competent. For PCAOB inspections, Big Four firms disagreed more frequently 
with the findings than smaller firms did. However, as only two studies directly asked audit 
firms about their opinion on PCAOB inspectors, and neither integrated the view of audit 
firms that had already left the audit market, conclusions have to be made with reservations.  
The framework’s second criterion refers to the question of whether financial markets 
recognise peer reviews and inspection reports as informative for decision-making. When the 
peer review system was voluntary, financial markets considered peer review reports to be 
informative signals of audit quality (compared to non-reviewed firms). However, when the 
system became mandatory the peer review system’s signaling power decreased significantly: 
peer review reports had only a marginal effect on the financial judgments of financial experts 
and were not considered by audit committees in the selection process of audit firms. Peer 
reviews were not seen as transparent instruments to signal audit quality. The accounting 
profession shared this perception, as they did not believe that their clients would take review 
results into consideration. Thus, it can be concluded that while it was possible to differentiate 
between peer reviewed firms and non-reviewed firms, markets were not able to differentiate 
between different types of review results. Empirical findings concerning the market’s 
awareness of PCAOB reports are less clear. Indeed, some authors do not identify an 
association between PCAOB outcomes and departing clients, whereas others point out that 
negative reports increase the likelihood of losing clients involuntarily and that the stock price 
movements of the clients of audit firms are sensitive to the issuance of inspection reports. 
Interestingly, not much work can be found on the perception of individual financial experts or 
of the accounting profession about the PCAOB inspections. Only one study found that 
PCAOB reports improved the credibility of future audit opinions.  
Finally, the framework’s third aspect focuses on the effect of peer reviews and PCAOB 
reports on audit quality. Empirical work on peer reviews has mostly used alternative 
assessments, such as outcomes of inspections conducted by state authorities, SEC 
enforcement actions, or compliance with GAAP, to reveal the effect of peer reviews on audit 
quality. The studies indicate that reviewed firms (compared to non-reviewed firms) 
conducted higher-quality governmental audits, were less likely to receive SEC sanctions, and 
showed fewer violations of GAAP reporting standards. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that surveys indicate that financial practitioners were highly critical of the peer review 
program’s ability to enhance audit quality; figures suggest that the majority did not believe in 
the system’s effect on audit practices or its ability to detect material misrepresentation during 
a review process. Empirical work on the PCAOB has primarily used client-specific measures 
to assess the contribution of the inspection to overall audit quality. These results indicate that 
PCAOB opinions are able distinguish earnings quality and that audit firms with detected 
deficiencies are more likely to issue going-concern opinions. Moreover, the rate of abnormal 
accruals of clients by audit firms declines subsequent to inspections. Another indicator of the 
PCAOB’s contribution to overall audit quality is that studies show that PCAOB inspections 
incentivize low-quality audit firms to exit the audit market. Moreover, the analysis points out 
that triennially inspected firms tend to neglect the effect of PCAOB inspections on audit 
quality, while a more positive perception concerning the effect of the inspections on overall 
audit quality can be identified for larger audit firms.  
Table 7 shows the synthesized result of the analysis. 
 
 
7. Research gaps in audit regulation and future research potential 
 
The analysis shows that the academic research on peer review and PCAOB inspection is 
extensive. At the same time, however, prior literature is still ambiguous and conflicting. In 
other words, mixed results (still) remain the rule rather than the exception. Contrasting the 
research of the two regulatory regimes does also highlight areas which remained neglected 
due to a dominance of quantitative research design and taken-for-granted assumptions. The 
following section therefore outlines some potential research endeavors.  
 
7.1. Analyzing validity in full: the objectivity of reviewers and inspectors  
 
Research has examined the validity of peer reviews in various ways. However, it is 
striking that, apart from direct surveys among the profession, studies on the expertise of peer 
review teams or analyses that take a closer and detailed look at the composition of review 
teams do not exist. The bulk of audit regulation appears to focus on matters of review 
independence instead of on the competence of reviewers. Insights are missing about the 
outcome and process effects of individual reviewer’s competencies and of review team 
compositions. In particular, research has to address the possible effects of auditors for which 
peer reviews represent only an ancillary activity to their primary audit-related responsibilities 
(Carcello et al., 2011, p. 86). This is particularly important because, both in the U.S. and in 
other jurisdictions at the global level, the peer review system remains the dominant mode of 
external quality control for audit firms with non-listed companies as clients.  
The literature analysis attests the same gap with respect to research about PCAOB 
inspections. The PCAOB is established as a formally independent authority; yet, the 
objectivity of inspectors should not be taken for granted a priori. This is because 
independence and objectivity, although having a substantial overlap, should not be used 
synonymously. Whereas “independence” is more an organizational attribute, “objectivity” 
relates to the unbiased mental attitude of reviewers and inspectors. Although anecdotal 
evidence indicates that PCAOB inspectors possess a high level of auditing experience 
(Glover et al., 2009; Lennox & Pittman, 2010), not much is really known about their 
background or their rationales for working for a governmental agency. The formal 
independence of the PCAOB regime might therefore not prevent the inspection process from 
being influenced by the individual characteristics, experience, and former affiliation of the 
particular inspector, and other possible process- and outcome-related factors. Disentangling 
independence from objectivity might therefore be a fruitful path for future research to analyze 
the extent and implications of regulatory capture of the PCAOB by the accounting profession.  
 
7.2. Process rather than result orientation: the PCAOB inspection process 
 
Both in peer reviews and PCAOB inspections, the risk of “creative-compliance” exists. 
This term refers to the practice of “complying with” rules by box-ticking, rather than taking 
substantive organizational steps (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012). The inspection procedures 
under the PCAOB are not significantly different than the former review procedures, although 
Fogarty (1996, p. 253) has criticized that the “peer review process is predicated on the rather 
dubious presumption that the quality of the audit can be understood by an examination of the 
audit’s working papers.” They are based on an ex-post evaluation of the work conducted by 
the audit firm, and a disagreement with the audit firm’s opinion about an audit engagement is 
interpreted as evidence of audit deficiency (Peecher, Solomon, & Trotman, 2013, p. 21). 
Thus, it could be the case, that the PCAOB’s judgments are affected by the same factors as 
those found in studies on peer reviews (Emby et al., 2002; King et al., 1994; Peecher et al., 
2013), and that the efficacy of PCAOB inspections may be enhanced by focusing on process 
modifications. This is particularly important as the intensity of inspections (e.g. the amount of 
inspected audits) is not static: during an inspection, the inspection plan can be revised in 
order to target additional audits, which in most instances increases the number of 
deficiencies, and thereby worsens the formal assessment of audit quality (PCAOB member 
Goelzer, 2005). To date, this field has only been partially addressed by proposing evaluations 
of the inspection by the inspected firm (Daugherty & Tervo, 2010), or by arguing for a 
transition from outcome-oriented judgments to a more process-oriented approach (Peecher et 
al., 2013). Future research has therefore to move beyond the classical dichotomy of reviews 
versus inspections, to reveal the potentials of process modifications of external quality 
controls on audit quality.  
 
7.3. Opening the black box through methodological pluralism  
 
Regulatory failure needs to be separated from the organizational failures of regulated 
parties: “a late train [does] not necessarily indicate poor railway regulation” (Baldwin et al., 
2012). In the end, it is the individual audit firm that determines audit quality. This is 
particularly crucial as a PCAOB inspection encompasses an entire organization: in addition to 
the inspection of specific audit engagements, the examination of the quality control system 
includes a detailed assessment of a firm’s general management and monitoring system in 
which formal and informal reporting structures, and the interactions of various committees 
and divisions within the firm, are assessed (Gradison & Boster, 2010). Therefore, it is 
important to assess the intra-organizational learning processes subsequent to an inspection. 
Insights are particularly evident in order to interpret the gradual “improvement” in review 
and inspection results over time; a trend that can be found for both the review and the 
inspection system.  
The mean number of weaknesses in unmodified reports was 3.06 for the period between 
1980 and 1986 (Wallace, 1991), decreased to 1.44 for the period between 1985 and 1999 
(Casterella et al., 2009), and went further down to 1.04 in review reports from 1997 to 2003 
(Hilary & Lennox, 2005). A similar trend can be identified for the PCAOB inspections as the 
number of identified deficiencies decreased for triennially (Anantharaman, 2012; Hermanson 
et al., 2007; Landis, Jerris, & Braswell, 2011; Ragothaman, 2012) and annually inspected 
firms (Church & Shefchik, 2012). In addition, the percentage of firms with quality control 
problems decreased (Hermanson & Houston, 2009), while the number of clean inspection 
reports increased (Gramling et al., 2011; Offermanns & Peek, 2011). Moreover, while the 
majority of firms had deficiencies in their first report, less than ten percent had deficiencies in 
their second report (Daugherty et al., 2011; Hermanson & Houston, 2009; Landis et al., 
2011).  
Yet, the interpretation of these “positive” trends is associated with methodological 
difficulties because different factors might have an effect on the results without enhancing the 
level of audit quality. Alternative explanations might be that the inspection philosophy 
shifted over time or that the audit firms have become better prepared for the inspections by 
providing special attention to issues that are likely targets for inspection (i.e., high-risk 
issues), or by “stylizing working papers to appease inspectors” (Church & Shefchik, 2012, p. 
61).9 Thus, although literature suggests that the results for an audit firm improve with the 
number of review and inspections, the organizational learning process is unknown, and 
whether and how internal structures are adjusting due to identified deficiencies is still 
                                                 
9
 In fact, the AICPA offered trial-run peer reviews to CPA firms without review experience to prepare them for 
the actual review process (Wallace, 1991). 
unclear. In other words, what is really learned from the inspection process, and whether and 
how the findings change, shape, or shift the audit practices of organizations, remains 
unfathomable. An explanation for the lack of empirical findings about the processes of 
inspections and about the organizational learning of audit firms might be the general 
dominance of quantitative research designs, while other methods, such as field work in audit 
research, are hardly existent (Humphrey, 2008; Power, 2003). However, qualitative methods, 
such as participatory observations or qualitative interviews, could explore the interplay of 
inspectors and the audit firm during an inspection process and the subsequent diffusion of 
findings and improvements within the audit firms—and provide answers to what is really 
learnt from the external audit quality controls. 
 
7.4. Focusing on the real causes for the regulatory shift: audit quality and the Big Four 
 
Regulatory actions fail when the established regulatory regime does not produce the 
outcomes stipulated in its mandate (Baldwin et al., 2012). The accounting manipulations of 
Enron and other major companies were interpreted as evidence of serious shortcomings in the 
self-regulatory system of the auditing profession. Given the fact that the overall annual audit 
failure was close to zero (e.g. Francis, 2004; Palmrose, 1988), it was especially the roles of 
the Big Four that were in the focus of the public and political outcry. The large accounting 
firms exert significant influence on the U.S. economy: they audit more than 80 percent of all 
U.S. public companies, accounting for approximately 99 percent of US-based issuer market 
capitalization (Roybark, 2006, p. 145). Yet there is a paradoxical mismatch between the 
importance of this particular segment of the auditing profession and research’s focus (see 
table 10).  
 
While it is known that triennially inspected firms (firms with less than 100 clients) that 
have received deficiency reports have a higher ratio of clients to personnel and relatively 
small personal resources (Hermanson & Houston, 2008; Hermanson et al., 2007), less 
industry expertise (Gunny, Krishnan, & Zhang, 2007), and clients with low earnings quality 
(Gunny & Zhang, 2013), insights about annually inspected firms is limited. The fact that 95 
percent of triennially inspected audit firms have fewer than ten clients (DeFond & Lennox, 
2011, p. 25) makes the mismatch between relevance and research findings even more evident. 
To date, only the studies by Carcello et al. (2011), Church and Shefchik (2012), Gunny 
and Zhang (2013) and Houston and Stefaniak (2013) allow conclusions regarding the effect 
and perception of PCAOB inspection on large accounting audit firms. But while Carcello et 
al. demonstrate that PCAOB inspections distinguish audit quality, Gunny and Zhang do not 
find supporting evidence. Methodological problems are the lack of variation of PCAOB 
reports for Big Four firms and the fact that, although quality control deficiencies have been 
found in every Big Four inspection, they remain mostly beyond the scope of academia 
because they are addressed in a timely manner, remaining undisclosed (Church & Shefchik, 
2012). While scientific evidence exists concerning the interrelations of the Big Four within 
the international regulatory arena (Gillis, Petty, & Suddaby, 2014; Humphrey, Moizer, & 
Turley, 2006; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007), it seems that research has partially 
overlooked the roots and causes of the shift from self-regulation to government regulation. As 
a result, to date, it has only scratched the surface of whether government regulation really 
decreased the risk of large accounting scandals.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
For more than one decade, the U.S. audit profession has now been monitored by PCAOB 
inspections under government oversight. This paper reviews research on the former peer 
review system and the current PCAOB system. Prior literature is analyzed and synthesized 
along three research axes: the validity of reviews and inspections, the recognition of reviews 
and PCAOB inspections for decision-making, and the effect of reviews and inspections on 
audit quality.  
Research on the former peer review system is consistent with regard to several findings. 
First, the results indicate that the initial introduction of external quality controls through peer 
reviews enhanced the quality of services provided by audit firms. When reviewed firms were 
compared with non-reviewed firms, the reviewed firms were found to have conducted higher 
quality governmental audits, were less likely to have received SEC sanctions, and showed 
fewer violations of GAAP reporting standards. When peer review became mandatory for 
AICPA member firms, the analysis suggests that users began to ignore review reports. This 
can be explained by the inability of financial actors to differentiate the audit quality among 
peer reviewed firms and/or by the awareness of the system’s main shortcoming: multiple 
studies provide evidence for the lack of objectivity to which the system was exposed. 
When analyzing research on the PCAOB regime, results indicate a positive effect of 
PCAOB inspections on audit quality. At the same time, however, audit firms themselves are 
rather skeptical concerning the effect of PCAOB inspection on audit quality. This mismatch 
has to be addressed by future research, in particular through research designs that focus on 
the intra-organizational learning processes of audit firms subsequent to PCAOB inspections. 
In addition, further research is necessary to elaborate whether financial markets really trust 
the credibility of public authorities. While one study demonstrated that market share of audit 
firms is insensitive to the content of PCAOB reports, other studies reveal the opposite. The 
absence of an overall quality rating, the fact that quality-control findings are kept 
confidential, and the three-year inspection cycle for triennially inspected firms might explain 
the market’s hesitation to take into account PCAOB inspections for decision-making 
purposes. These obstacles have also to be considered by other audit regulators around the 
globe, which aim at reforming their oversight structures to maintain or gain legitimacy in the 
public and the financial spheres.  
This study cannot eliminate the potential confusions that are associated with history, 
which is the main limitation of this study. For instance, confounding SOX provisions hamper 
research on the PCAOB inspections. Provisions, as management certifications change with 
regard to audit subcommittee independence (SOX, Sec. 301), or bans on the delivery of 
certain non-audit services (Sec 201), might simultaneously affect audit quality and other 
aspects under consideration. For this reason it is all the more important to shed light on the 
identified areas which have not been addressed yet, but are far from insignificant in 
importance. It remains therefore to be shown by future research whether direct government 
regulation has decreased the risk of large accounting scandals, political tsunamis, and further 
rounds of regulatory reforms. 
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Table 1: A summary of literature concerning the validity of peer reviews. 
 
Authors & date Method Research design Sample Key findings 
     
Wallace (1991) 
 
A Statistical analysis of the 
relationship of the type of 
peer reviewer (AICPA-
appointed review team, 
CPA firm, state-
sponsored team), and total 
findings in review reports.  
352 public peer reviews 
of the SECPS files from 
1980 through 1986. 
As the type of reviewer did not affect 
the number of review findings, the 
study concluded that the peer review 
process was reliable. 
     
     Wallace & 
Cravens (1994) 
CA Descriptive analysis of 
peer reviewee response 
letters to the AICPA. 
AICPA cover letters 
accompanying review 
files from 1980 through 
1986. 
The majority of the reviewed firms 
accepted the proposed suggestions 
from the review team. 
     
     King et al. 
(1994) 
E Experiment on the effect 
of a reviewer’s 
knowledge of a 
proceeding against the 
audit firm.  
49 experienced auditors 
reviewed an attestation 
engagement performed 
by auditors from small 
accounting firms. 
Peer reviewer’s knowledge of a 
negative allegation negatively 
influenced a peer reviewer’s 
evaluation.  
     
     Ehlen & Welker 
(1996) 
S Survey among CPA firms 
about the AICPA peer 
review system. 
294 firms that had a 
peer review under the 
Division for CPA Firms 
and 292 firms that had a 
review under the QRP. 
The majority of reviewed firms (85% 
in the Division and 76% in the QRP) 
perceived their reviewers seen as fair 
in the review process. 
 
 
 
  
     
     Emby et al.  
(2002) 
E Examination of the 
influence of prior 
outcome knowledge on 
peer evaluation judgments 
of audit partners. 
122 audit partners from 
Canada and the United 
States. 
Auditors who received outcome 
information tended to rate outcome-
consistent items of evidence as more 
important. 
     
     Hilary & 
Lennox (2005) 
A Statistical analysis of the 
relationship between peer 
reviewer characteristics 
and review findings. 
Sample of 1,001 SECPS 
reviews issued in the 
years 1997 to 2003. 14 
reviews were performed 
by AICPA teams, 73 
reviews by CPA 
associations, and 914 
were firm-on-firm 
reviews.  
 
 
 
 
Reviewing firms were less likely to 
disclose problems if they did not 
compete against reviewed firms.  
 
     
     Lennox & 
Pittman (2010) 
A Statistical analysis of the 
association between 
review outcome and the 
change of an audit firm's 
reviewer.  
545 PCAOB inspection 
reports in 2007; 1,001 
peer review reports 
between 1997 and 2003.  
The study validates criticism that the 
peer review lacked objectivity as 
audit firms chose their reviewers 
strategically: a reviewer was more 
likely to be changed (retained) if it 
previously issued an unfavorable 
(favorable) opinion. 
     
     Anantharaman 
(2012) 
A Comparison of peer 
review reports and 
PCAOB inspection 
reports. 
407 firms’ last peer 
review and first 
PCAOB inspection 
report. 
The type of reviewer affected the 
review result: audit firms that chose 
their own reviewers tended to receive 
more favorable peer review reports 
than their subsequent PCAOB 
reports.  
     
     A = archival, E = experimental, S = survey, CA = content analysis 
 Table 2: A summary of literature concerning the recognition of peer reviews in decision-
making.  
 
Authors & date Method Research design Sample Key findings 
 
 
   Francis et al. 
(1990) 
A Audit fees as proxy for 
audit quality, to see 
whether reviewed firms 
are perceived as quality-
differentiated auditors. 
208 audit observations 
from 1984/1985, 
audited from non-Big 
Eight auditors.  
 
 
The voluntary membership in the peer 
review programme did not affect the 
audit fees of audit firms: No 
systematic audit fee difference 
between member and non-member 
CPA firms was observed.  
     
     File et al. (1992) S Perception of bankers and 
auditors about peer 
reviews. 
Questionnaires sent to 
100 bankers and 100 
randomly selected 
auditors. 
Peer review reports, compared to firm 
size and industrial expertise, had only 
marginal effect on financial 
judgments of financial experts. 
     
     Elsea & Stewart 
(1995) 
S Perception of CPA firms 
about the peer reviews 
system. 
437 questionnaires from 
reviewed Colorado 
CPA firms. 
Majority of audit firms did not 
believe that their clients were 
interested in their peer review results.  
     
     Giroux et al. 
(1995) 
A Audit fees as proxy for 
audit quality, to see 
whether reviewed firms 
are perceived as quality-
differentiated auditors. 
232 quality review 
control audits 
conducted by the Texas 
Education Agency for 
its fiscal years 1985 to 
1988. 
Peer reviewed firms provided higher 
audit quality with audit price 
premium (compared with non-
reviewed firms) related to more 
extensive audit procedures.  
     
     Ehlen & Welker 
(1996) 
S Perception of CPA firms 
about peer review. 
294 firms that had a 
peer review under the 
Division for CPA Firms 
and 292 firms that had a 
review under the QRP. 
Majority of audit firms believed that 
their clients would not show interest 
in peer review results. 
     
     Alam et al. 
(2000) 
S Perception of financial 
analysts, banks, and audit 
clients of peer review. 
233 usable responses: 
42% from CPA firms, 
42% from banks, and 
18% from financial 
analysts. 
Participants did not believe that audit 
firms’ clients and investors 
understood the procedures and 
mechanisms of a peer review. 
     
     Schneider & 
Ramsay (2000) 
S Perception of bank 
lending officers about 
peer reviews. 
Survey of 193 bank 
lending-officers. 
Peer reviews did not directly affect 
the financial judgment of bankers, 
unless the results of peer reviews 
were specifically provided to them.  
     
     Woodlock & 
Claypool (2001) 
S Perception of peer 
reviews by audit 
committees. 
Checklist survey of 68 
audit committees 
serving large publicly 
traded corporations. 
Audit committees selected an audit 
firm without considering peer review 
reports. 
     
     Payne (2003) E Experiment designed to 
investigate audit quality 
and pricing under settings 
that manipulate the timing 
of the peer review 
process. 
Eight multi-period 
laboratory markets 
contracting via a 
computerized sealed-
offer auction. Each 
market has four buyers 
(clients) and four sellers 
(auditors). 
The three-year review cycle impeded 
the market’s reaction towards peer 
review.  
     
     Hilary & 
Lennox (2005) 
A Association between peer 
review reports and 
changes in number of 
clients. 
1,001 reviews issued in 
the years 1997–2003. 
Peer reviews provided information to 
clients about audit firm quality: in the 
analysis, peer reviewed firms gained 
(lost) clients after they received clean 
(modified/adverse) opinions. 
     
 A = archival, E = experimental, E = experimental, S = survey 
 
 
Table 3: A summary of literature concerning the effect of peer reviews on audit quality. 
 
Authors & date Method Research design Sample Key findings 
 
 
   
Bremser & 
Gramling 
(1988) 
A Number of comments as 
proxy for educational 
contribution to audit 
quality. 
66 CPA member firms 
of the Division’s 
SECPS, which had been 
peer reviewed at least 
twice. 
The participation in a peer review 
decreased the number of comments in 
review reports.  
     
     Deis & Giroux 
(1992) 
A Relationship between peer 
review membership and 
governmental control 
findings, which served as 
proxy for audit quality. 
308 quality control 
reviews, conducted by 
the Audit Division of 
the Texas Education 
Agency from 1984 to 
1989. 
Audit firms that voluntarily 
participated in the peer review 
programme conducted higher-quality 
audits.  
     
     Felix & Prawitt 
(1993) 
S Perception of CPA firms 
about the peer review 
system. 
115 questionnaires 
filled by SECPS audit 
firms.  
30% of CPA members reported 
positive changes in their audit 
practices as a result of peer reviews. 
     
     McCabe et al. 
(1993) 
S Perception of CPA 
partners about the peer 
review system. 
195 firms from the 
Division for CPA 
Firms, from PCPS and 
SECPS. 
The majority of firms doubted that 
peer review increased a firm’s ability 
to detect material misrepresentation.  
     
     O’Keefe et al. 
(1994) 
A For a sample of school 
district audits regulated 
by the California State 
Controller's Office, an 
index was obtained of the 
number and importance of 
violations of GAAS 
reporting standards by 
each school district's audit 
firm.  
935 school district 
audits from 1986. 
 
 
Participation in peer review (through 
the firms’ membership in the 
AICPA’s Division of Firms) was not 
related to violations of reporting 
standards. 
     
     Giroux et al. 
(1995) 
A Time of audit engagement 
as a surrogate for audit 
quality. 
232 quality review 
control audits 
conducted by the Texas 
Education Agency 
between 1985 and 1988. 
Reviewed firms spent more time on 
audit engagements, which was 
interpreted as higher-quality audits.  
     
     Grant et al. 
(1996) 
E Experimental design, 
auditing modeled as a 
multi-personal social 
dilemma. 
A series of laboratory 
experiments using 142 
upper level under-
graduate accounting 
majors and first-year 
MBA students as 
subjects. 
In the experiment the level of audit 
quality increased in a self-regulatory 
regime. 
     
     Rollins & 
Bremser (1997) 
A Analysis of the 
relationship between  
an audit firm’s 
characteristics or type of 
financial reporting 
violations and 
enforcement actions 
against the auditor.  
 
 
 
91 enforcement cases, 
in which the SEC issued 
Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs).  
 
The participation in peer reviews 
decreased the likelihood of receiving 
SEC sanctions. 
     
     Colbert & 
Murray (1998) 
A Statistical relationship 
between reviewee 
characteristics and peer 
reviewer’s review 
findings. 
422 small CPA firms 
selected from the 
ACIPA’s Private 
Companies Practice 
Section. 
The study identified that audit firms 
improved their peer review ratings 
over time: firms with a larger number 
of previous reviews received more 
favorable ratings. 
     
     Shafer et al. 
(1999) 
E Experiment about the 
effect of formal sanction 
threats on auditors’ 
behavior.  
Research instruments 
were mailed to a 
random sample of 
AICPA members. 
Peer review did not provide adequate 
incentives for audit firms to reduce 
the incidence of financial statement 
misstatements. 
     
     Krishnan & 
Schauer (2000) 
A Relationship between peer 
review and compliance 
with GAAP. 
35 clients of Big Six 
firms, 129 clients of 
non-Big Six firms. 
In the study, the participation in a 
peer review increased the compliance 
with GAAP.  
     
     Alam et al. 
(2000) 
S Survey on the 
effectiveness of peer 
review in improving audit 
quality among key 
constituents. 
233 usable responses 
from CPA firms, audit 
clients, bankers, and 
financial analysts.  
 
.  
The constituents did not agree on the 
importance of peer in helping audit 
firms better detect fraud in financial 
statements. When compared to the 
other groups, accounting firms 
viewed peer review as being least 
important for “improving fraud 
detection”. 
     
     Casterella et al. 
(2009) 
A Relationship between files 
of insurance company 
specializing in 
professional liability and 
peer review reports.  
158 files of an 
insurance company that 
specialized in 
professional liability 
coverage for local and 
regional accounting 
firms. 
Peer review was identified as an 
effective mechanism for 
differentiating quality among audit 
firms: The study demonstrated a link 
between the number of weaknesses in 
a peer review report and the 
likelihood of that firm having a 
malpractice claim filed against it, and 
various firm-specific indicators for 
risk/quality. 
     
     A = archival, E = experimental, S = survey 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: A summary of literature concerning the validity of the PCAOB inspections. 
 
Authors & date Method Research design Sample Key findings 
     Glover et al. 
(2009) 
C Evaluation of the PCAOB 
inspection process.  
Anecdotal evidence. Anecdotal evidence indicated that 
inspectors did not possess appropriate 
knowledge to assess audit 
engagements. 
     
     Daugherty & 
Tervo (2010) 
S Perception of triennially 
inspected audit firms of 
PCAOB inspections.  
146 accountants of 
small registered public 
accounting firms. 
The performance of the PCAOB 
inspection team was seen as 
appropriate.  
     
     Newman & 
Oliverio (2010) 
S A survey which focused 
on the PCAOB inspection 
process of no-deficiency 
firms. 
From a list of 251 firms, 
a random sample of 115 
firms was selected with 
no attention to whether 
they had received one 
or two no-deficiency 
inspections. 
The majority of firms viewed the 
inspectors as knowledgeable, 
competent, and fair. 
     
     Blankley et al. 
(2012) 
CA Analysis of the response 
letters to the PCAOB 
from triennially inspected 
audit firms.  
1,081 response letters. Firms with engagement deficiencies 
were more likely to disagree with the 
PCAOB’s assessment.  
     
     Church & 
Shefchik (2012) 
R Analysis of the inspection 
reports of large 
accounting firms. 
All 2004–2009 
inspection reports from 
large accounting firms.  
Big Four firms disagreed more 
frequently with findings than second-
tier firms.  
     
     Ragothaman 
(2012) 
A Comparison of quality 
control deficiencies in 
PCAOB reports and peer 
review reports.  
106 PCAOB reports for 
triennially inspected 
firms: and 2,355 
AICPA peer review 
reports for firms with 
less than 100 SEC audit 
clients. 
PCAOB inspectors were identified as 
tougher than peer reviewers as  
PCAOB quality control reports 
contained a significantly higher 
number of deficiencies than peer 
review reports.  
     
     
Houston & 
Stefaniak 
(2013) 
 
S Questionnaire with three 
sets of questions related to 
PCAOB inspections and 
Internal Quality Reviews 
(IQR). 
107 U.S. multiple 
partners from 
international, national, 
and regional public 
accounting firms.  
A majority of partners perceived that, 
relative to IQR reviewers, PCAOB 
inspectors had a worse understanding 
of firms’ audit methodologies and 
examined less audit areas.  
     
     A = archival, C = commentary, R = review, S = survey, CA = content analysis 
 
 
 
Table 5: A summary of literature concerning the recognition of PCAOB inspections in decision-making. 
  
Authors & date Method Research design Sample Key findings 
     Lennox & 
Pittman (2010) 
A Association between the 
number of inspection 
findings and the change in 
the number of clients of 
small and large audit 
firms.  
545 PCAOB inspection 
reports through 2007, 
1,001 peer review 
reports between 1997 
and 2003. 
No association was found between 
PCAOB inspection outcome and 
client losses.  
     
     Robertson & 
Houston (2010) 
E Association between the 
type of deficiencies and 
the anticipation of future 
audit opinions. 
142 MBA students as a 
proxy for non-
professional investors. 
PCAOB reports served as a useful 
tool to improve the credibility of audit 
opinions. The degree to which the 
perception increased was determined 
by (1) firms’ responses to reports with 
concessions, (2) reports with high 
(low) deficiencies, (3) for small 
(large) firms. 
     
     Offermanns & 
Peek (2011) 
A Variance in stock return 
of auditors’ clients as an 
indication for market 
reaction to PCAOB 
inspection reports.  
224 first-round and 134 
second-round inspection 
reports from 2005 to 
2010. 
PCAOB inspection reports affected 
the value of an audit firm’s client 
through their effect on information 
quality.  
     
     Wainberg et al. 
(2011) 
A Association between 
PCAOB reports and 
perceived and actual audit 
quality. 
1,129 PCAOB reports 
for small audit firms for 
the years 2004 to 2010. 
PCAOB reports were identified as 
ineffective instruments for signaling 
audit quality. 
     
     Daugherty et al. 
(2011) 
A Association between 
deficiency reports and the 
client loss of triennially 
inspected firms.  
748 inspections 
performed on triennially 
inspected firms for the 
years 2005 to 2008. 
Negative PCAOB reports increased 
the likelihood of losing clients 
involuntarily, while deficiencies 
related to the quality control system 
had no effect. 
     
     Robertson et al. 
(2014) 
E Association between 
PCAOB reports and 
perceived audit quality.  
90 responses from 
independent mailings to 
U.S. public company 
financial executives. 
PCAOB inspection reports decreased 
perceived audit quality. 
     
     Houston & 
Stefaniak 
(2013) 
 
S Questionnaire with three 
sets of questions related to 
PCAOB inspections and 
Internal Quality Reviews 
(IQR). 
107 U.S. multiple 
partners from 
international, national, 
and regional public 
accounting firms.  
Participants believed that PCAOB 
inspectors were more focused on 
finding deficiencies than were IQR 
reviewers, and that the IQR feedback 
was more helpful for improving audit 
quality.  
     
     Abbott et al. 
(2013) 
A Relation between the 
PCAOB inspection 
reports with GAAP 
deficiencies and the audit 
firms’ clients. 
521 triennially 
inspected accounting 
firms, PCAOB 
inspection reports filed 
from 2005 to 2007. 
PCAOB inspections served as signal 
of audit quality for smaller firms: 
Clients of GAAP-deficient audit firms 
were more likely to dismiss their 
auditors in favor of audit firms 
without GAAP-deficiencies. 
     
     A = archival, C = commentary, E = experimental, S = survey 
 
Table 6: A summary of literature concerning the effect of PCAOB inspections on audit quality. 
 
Authors & date Method Research design Sample Key findings 
     Read et al. 
(2004) 
I Interviews with audit 
firms on the reasons for 
ceasing SEC audits. 
155, 144, 206, and 270 
audit resignations in 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 
2003, respectively. 
Small audit firms that ceased 
performing SEC audits explained 
their deregistering due to the 
perceived stringent PCAOB 
oversight.  
     
     Hermanson & 
Houston (2008) 
A Analysis of the 
characteristics of firms 
whose quality control 
defects were disclosed on 
the PCAOB website.  
Defects for 20 smaller 
registered audit firms 
from 2005 to 2006. 
PCAOB inspections identified 
understaffed audit firms which 
provide low-quality services. 
     
     Hermanson & 
Houston (2009) 
A Comparison of the results 
of first-round and second-
round inspections.  
116 PCAOB inspection 
reports of smaller firms' 
second inspections. 
PCAOB inspections improved the 
audit firms’ auditing services.  
     
     Daugherty & 
Tervo (2010) 
S Survey of triennially 
inspected audit firms 
focusing on the PCAOB’s 
effect on audit quality.  
146 leaders of public 
accounting firms, which 
are triennially 
inspected.  
Larger firms in the sample believed 
that PCAOB inspections improved 
audit quality, while small firms did 
not believe in an improvement.  
     
     Newman & 
Oliverio (2010) 
S Survey of firms that had 
received a no-deficiency 
report. 
From a list of 251 firms, 
a random sample of 115 
firms was selected with 
no attention to whether 
they had received one 
or two no-deficiency 
inspections. 
The majority of survey firms believed 
that PCAOB inspections would be 
necessary and agreed that PCAOB 
inspections are effective.  
     
     Daugherty et al. 
(2011) 
A Analysis of the effect of 
negative PCAOB 
inspections on triennially 
inspected audit firms.  
748 inspections 
performed on triennially 
inspected auditors for 
reports released from 
2005 to 2008. 
Deficiency reports were associated 
with audit firms voluntarily resigning 
from the audit market.  
     
     Carcello et al. 
(2011) 
A Effect of PCAOB 
inspections on earnings 
management of audit firm 
clients. 
Changes in abnormal 
accruals between 2004 
and 2006 for 4,719 Big 
Four clients. 
PCAOB inspections improved audit 
quality, measured by a reduction in 
the auditees earnings management in 
the first and second year following a 
PCAOB inspection.  
     
     Gramling et al. 
(2011) 
A Association between 
PCAOB outcomes and 
client firms’ 
characteristics.  
407 triennially 
inspected firms (11,879 
client-year 
observations) from 
2004 to 2006. 
Audit firms with PCAOB-identified 
deficiencies were more likely to issue 
a GC opinion for financially 
distressed clients subsequent to their 
PCAOB inspection than prior to their 
inspection.  
     
     DeFond & 
Lennox (2011) 
A Characteristics of small 
audit firms exiting the 
audit market.  
All small audit firms 
exiting audit market 
from 2001 to 2008. 
PCAOB inspections incentivized 
lower quality audit firms to exit the 
market.  
     
     Blankley et al. 
(2012) 
CA Analysis of the response 
letters of triennially 
inspected audit firms to 
the PCAOB. 
1,081 response letters. 50% of responding firms expressed 
support for the PCAOB and 
suggested that inspections would lead 
to improvements in audit quality. 
     
     Gunny & Zhang 
(2013) 
A Association between 
PCAOB outcomes and 
client firms’ 
characteristics. 
527 triennially and 
annually inspected firm 
inspection reports from 
2005 to 2009. 
Deficiency audit firms were 
associated with low audit quality 
indicators (abnormal accruals and 
propensity to restate) when PCAOB 
reports were seriously deficient. 
     
     A = archival, E = experimental, S = survey, I = interview, CA = content analysis 
 
Table 7: Synthesized result 
 
Dimension  Peer reviews  PCAOB inspections 
Validity  
 Expertise: high  
Independence: impaired 
 Expertise: mixed findings  
Independence: no studies exist 
Recognition in decision-making  
 Voluntary system: yes 
Mandatory system: mixed findings 
 
mixed findings 
Effect on audit quality 
 Voluntary system: yes 
Mandatory system: mixed findings 
 
yes 
 
 
 
Table 8: Analyzed data of studies on PCAOB inspections 
 
Studies using data of triennially inspected audit firms Studies using data of annually inspected audit firms  
•  •  
• Hermanson et al. (2007) 
• Hermanson & Houston (2009) 
• Daugherty & Tervo (2010) 
• Daugherty et al. (2011) 
• Gramling et al. (2011)  
• Landis et al. (2011)  
• Ragothaman (2012)  
• Blankley et al. (2012)  
• Abbott et al. (2013) 
• Carcello et al. (2011)  
• Church & Shefchik (2012)  
• Gunny & Zhang (2013) (data both from triennially 
and annually inspected firms )  
• Houston & Stefaniak (2013) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
